The Restitution Interest
- The Restitution Interest
- Definition
- As a cause of action: similar to contract cause of action, but not the same. The essence of the action is to get the thing or the value of the thing that belongs to the P and is now (or was) in D’s possession. Often used by P’s whose contract with D was for some reason unenforceable; or, may be used by P’s who didn’t even have a contract-like relationship with D.
- As damages: damages for breach of contract are said to be justified under the theory of restitution when P’s recovery is measured by the benefit that P’s act conferred upon D.
- Bailey v. West
- Facts: Δ purchased a horse then discovered it was lame. Δ took the horse to Π’s farm. Π fed and housed the horse and sent Δ a bill which was not paid. Π is suing for restitution.
- Issue: Was there a contract, and what is the damage for breach?
- Analysis:
- “Implied in fact:” The source of the obligation is the intention of the parties. Court finds no mutual agreement or “intent to promise” b/w Π and Δ so as to establish contract “implied in fact.”
- D had no prior relationship with Π; Δ told Π he would not be responsible; D did not arrange for horse to be boarded with Π, but arranged for horse to go back to original seller
- “Quasi-contract:” 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 6: CB 77. Nothing to do with intention; promise nor privity are required; obligation arises not from consent, but from the law of “natural justice and equity.” Quasi-contracts are not real contracts! Fiction!
- Elements of the Quasi-contract(prof. notes these in class): 1) Benefit conferred upon Δ by Π, 2) appreciation by Δ of such benefit, and 3) acceptance and retention by Δ of such benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable to retain the benefit without payment to the Π of the value thereof.
- Π was acting as a volunteer (prof. notes Court’s use of “volunteer”–which, if one meets the technical definition, is taken outside the realm of being party to a quasi-contract due -most likely- to the “inequitable” provision): if performance is rendered by one person w/out any request by another, it is very unlikely this person will be under a legal duty to pay compensation.
- “Implied in fact:” The source of the obligation is the intention of the parties. Court finds no mutual agreement or “intent to promise” b/w Π and Δ so as to establish contract “implied in fact.”
- Held: no contract, and since there was no request for payment prior to caring for the horse, no restitution can be paid. (Π volunteered for the job.)
- Restatement of Restitution §2
- “A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution.”
- Recovery is going to be denied by those persons when the benefit has been forced upon them without their will
- “A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution.”
- Law and the Economics of Restitution
- Doctor administers first aid to a stranger on the street vs.
- Musician playing violin for a woman waiting for a bus
- In the common law, the doctor would usually have a legal claim, the musician would usually not. Why?
- Posner says that the costs of the voluntary transaction would be prohibitive in the doctor case
- Incapacity
- Time
- No time to discuss terms when someone is bleeding to death
- The musician conferred an unbargained for benefit in circumstances when the opportunity costs of a voluntary bargain would have been low
- Posner doesn’t persuade the casebook author
- Posner says that the costs of the voluntary transaction would be prohibitive in the doctor case
- Restitution doesn’t replace consideration, but provides a different basis for allowing recovery
- Definition